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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of
executive compensation paid through stock options. We examine the
extent to which tax policy has influenced the composition of executive
compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay for
tax policy. We begin by describing the tax rules for executive pay in
detail and analyzing how changes in various tax rates affect the tax
advantages of stock options relative to salary and bonus. Our empirical
analysis leads to three conclusions. First, there is little evidence that tax
changes have played a major role in the dramatic explosion in executive
stock-option pay since 1980. Although the tax advantage of options has
approximately doubled since the early 1980s, options currently have
only a slight tax advantage relative to cashapproximately $4 per $100
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of pretax compensation to the executive. A more convincing story for the
dramatic explosion in stock options involves changes in corporate gover-
nance and the market for corporate control. For example, there is a
strong correlation between the fraction of shares held by large institu-
tional investors and the fraction of executive pay in the form of stock
options, a result that holds both longitudinally and cross-sectionally.
Second, we find evidence that the million-dollar rule (which limited the
corporate deductibility of non-performance-related executive compensa-
tion to $1 million) led firms to adjust the composition of their pay away
from salary and toward performance-related pay, although our esti-
mates suggest that this substitution was minor. We find no evidence
that the regulation decreased the level of total compensation. Third, we
examine whether there is evidence for significant shifting of the timing
of option exercises in response to changes in tax rates. After replicating
Goolsbee's (1999) result regarding tax shifting with our data for the 1993
tax reform, we show that no such shifting occurred in either of the two
tax reforms of the 1980s. Moreover, we find evidence that much of the
unusually large level of option exercises in 1992 was the result of the
rising stock market rather than the change in marginal tax rates.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 15 years, there has been a major change in the way that
American executives, particularly CEOs, are paid. For many executives,
annual stock-option grants are now greater than cash compensation
(salary and bonus). Annual changes in CEO wealth from revaluations of
stock and stock-option holdings completely swamp cash compensation,
and provide substantial pay-to-performance sensitivity. All of this is a
dramatic change from the early 1980s, when the median stock-option
grant to top executives was zero.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which tax policy has influ-
enced the composition of executive compensation, and discuss the impli-
cations of rising stock-based pay for tax policy. Because top executives
manage assets worth billions of dollars, their compensation arrange-
ments and the incentives they face are of substantial importance to the
performance of the U.S. economy. Because top executives have very
high incomes, their responsiveness to taxation has important revenue
and efficiency implications.
We conduct a broad analysis of the taxation of executives. We begin by
studying how tax rates affect the degree to which options are favored
relative to cash and how the tax advantage of options has changed over
time in response to changes in corporate, personal, and capital gains taxTaxation of Executive Compensation3
rates. Although the tax advantage of options has approximately doubled
since the early 1980s, options currently have only a slight tax advantage
relative to cashapproximately $4 per $100 of pretax compensation.
We then analyze what we believe to be the three central policy ques-
tions regarding the taxation of executive pay. First, we examine the
extent to which the stock-option explosion has been influenced by the
many changes in tax rates over the past 20 years. The evidence suggests
that changes in taxation have likely had a very modest influence on the
option explosion. Instead, changes in corporate governance, especially
in the role of large institutional investors, appear to have provided the
main impetus for the increase in stock-based pay.
Second, we examine the effectiveness of tax policies aimed at curbing
what is deemed by some to be excessive levels of executive compensa-
tion. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code (the million-dollar
rule), which was enacted in 1993, put a $1-million limit on the deducti-
bifity (against corporate profits) of non-performance-related executive
pay. Although we find evidence that this rule led to a shift in the compo-
sition of payaway from salary and toward more performance-related
bonuses and stock optionsour evidence suggests that the magnitude
of this substitution was small. We find no evidence that the mfflion-
dollar rule decreased total executive compensation.
Third, we analyze the degree to which the tax code is efficient in
raising tax revenue from top executives. The stock-option explosion has
led to a new and important way for executives to lower their taxes in
response to changes in tax rates: by timing their stock-option gains. For
example, in 1993, it was widely reported in the press that well-known
CEOs such as Disney's Michael Eisner pushed their option gains into
1992 in order to avoid paying the higher personal income-tax rates imple-
mented in 1993. In an important paper, Goolsbee (1999) argues that the
tax shifting between 1992 and 1993 was enormous and was the direct
result of the increase in marginal tax rates during this period. After
replicating Goolsbee's evidence regarding tax shifting with our data for
the 1993 tax reform, we show that no such shifting occurred in response
to either of the two tax reforms of the 1980s. Moreover, our evidence
indicates that the stock market run-up in 1991 and 1992 was more impor-
tant than the change in marginal tax rates in causing the large option
gains observed in 1992.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss trends
in the level and performance sensitivity of executive compensation. In
section 3, we describe the tax and accounting rules concerning executive
compensation. In section 4, we analyze how taxes affect the degree to
which options are favored relative to cash. In section 5, we examine how4Hall & Liebman
the tax advantage of options has changed over time. In section 6, we
provide evidence on the effect of taxation on the composition of execu-
tive compensation. Section 7 contains empirical analysis of the million-
dollar rule. Section 8 contains evidence on tax shifting and option gains.
Section 9 concludes.
2. TRENDS IN TOP EXECUTIVE PAY
In this section, we document how top executive pay has changed over
time, and discuss how this change has caused the sensitivity of CEO
wealth to firm market value to increase substantially. There has been a
large increase in the level of CEO pay since 1980, and this growth has
been driven by the dramatic increase in stock-option grants during this
time (Hall and Liebman, 1998). Although salary and bonuses nearly
doubled over the period in inflation-adjusted terms, the mean value of
stock-option grants increased by 683 percent. The percentage increase in
the median stock-option award cannot be calculated, because the me-
dian stock-option grant was zero in 1980. The median CEO did not
receive an annual stock-option grant until 1985. Today, nearly all top
executives of large companies receive stock options, and the average
stock-option grant is now larger for most top executives than salary and
bonus combined.
The (inflation-adjusted) growth rate of CEO pay since 1980measured
narrowly (cash pay grew at an annual rate of 5 percent per year) or broadly
(cash plus option grants grew at almost 9 percent per year) or very broadly
(total compensation, including stock and stock-option appreciation, grew
at 11.5 percent per year)has been large relative to virtually all other
groups. Indeed, the growth rate of CEO pay since 1980 has been high
even relative to the pay increases of other high-income earners. For ex-
ample, the cutoff point for being in the top 0.5 percent of adjusted gross
income (ACT) increased by about 3.7 percent per year, about half the rate
for direct CEO compensation (excluding stock and option appreciation).
The only workers who appear to have had faster compensation growth
than CEOs are other "superstars." The annual pay of professional base-
ball players increased by approximately 9.8 percent per year, and that of
professional basketball players by 13.9 percent per year.
The increase in stock options has led to a large increase in the equity
holdings of top executives, and this in turn has led to a dramatic increase
in the responsiveness of executive wealth to firm performance. Nearly
all of the pay-to-performance sensitivity of executive compensation
comes from equity holdings; for a given increase in shareholder value,
changes in the value of an executive's stock and stock options are moreTaxation of Executive Compensation5
than 50 times larger than changes in salary and bonus (Hall and Lieb-
man, 1998).
As a concrete example, the estimates in Hall and Liebman (1998) imply
that a 10-percent increase in firm value (of the median company in our
sample) leads the company to increase the CEO's salary and bonus by
about $25,000. However, this same 10-percent increase in shareholder
value translates into $1.25-million increase in the value of the CEO's
stock and stock-option holdings.1
The dramatic rise in the ]irik between CEO wealth and firm perfor-
mance can be seen in Figure 1, which shows how two measures ofthis
link have increased since 1980.2 The first measure, the JensenMurphy
(1990) sharing rate (shown on the left scale), is the change in CEO wealth
for a $1,000 change in firm value. The second measure is the change in
CEO wealth for a 10-percent change in firm value (see Baker and Hall,
1998). Since both measures are strongly affected by firm size (the former
has a negative correlation and the latter has a positive correlation), the
pay-to-performance changes over time are estimated with regression
(quantile) analysis that controls for changes in the distribution of firm
sizes in the sample over time. The figure, therefore, shows the increase
in the pay-to-performance measures over time for a constant-size firm,
in this case a $1-billion firm (in constant 1998 dollars). The striking fact is
that both measures of the pay-to-performance link have increased by
nearly a factor of 10 since 1980. These pay-to-performance increases are
even larger than those we reported in our earlier paper that analyzed the
period 1980 to 1994, because of the large increase in stock-option grants
combined with the strong stock market performance in 1994 to 1998.
3. TAX AND ACCOUNTING RULES
Stock options give an executive the right but not the obligation to buy a
share of the company's stock at a prespecified pricethe exercise or strike
price. Typically, options cannot be exercised immediately. That is, they
vest (become owned by the executive, who can then exercise if he or she
1Stock-option grants are also very sensitive to changes in firm performance, mostly be-
cause many grants are multiyear plans that hold the yearly number of options constant,
and the same number of at-the-money options are worth more when the stock price is
higher and vice versa, if stock-option grant sensitivity is also included, then about 91
percent of pay-to-performance sensitivity comes from stock and stock-option revaluations,
7 percent comes from stock-option grant changes, and less than 2 percent comes from
changes in salary and bonus (Hall, 1999).
2Both measures include only the link created by CEO holdings of stock and stock options,
and ignore the smaller amount of pay-to-performance sensitivity that operates through



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Taxation of Executive Compensation7
wishes) slowly over time. Common vesting periods are in the three- to
five-year range, and options usually vest linearly (e.g., a four-year op-
tion vests at 25 percent at the end of each year). An executive typically
loses any unvested options upon departure. Although options may be
exercised as soon as they vest, they do not have to be exercised until
they expire or mature. Almost 85 percent of stock-option plans have a
term of exactly ten years, with virtually all of the remainder being in the
five- to ten-year range. About 95 percent of options are granted at the
money, or at fair market value, which means that the exercise price at grant
date is set equal to the stock price at grant date. The remaining 5 percent
are either discount options (so-called in-the-money options, where the
exercise price is below the stock price at grant date) or premium options
(so-called out-of-the-money options, where the exercise price is above
the stock price at grant date). The holders of options typically do not
have dividend rights or voting rights, even on vested options.3
3.1 Tax Rules and Stock-Option Compensation
Unlike salary and bonus, stock-option grants are typically an untaxed
event at the time of grant. For the most widely used optionsnonquali-
fled stock options (NQSOs)executives are taxed at the personal income
tax rate on option profits (the difference between that stock price and the
exercise price times the number of options) when the options are exer-
cised. The company receives a parallel deduction against corporate in-
come at that point. If the executive continues to hold the shares after
exercise, any subsequent appreciation is taxed at the capital gains rate in
the usual way. In 1993, an additional feature was added to the tax code
[Internal Revenue Code section 162(M)] that disallowed a corporate de-
duction for any executive pay above $1 million that is not performance-
based. While this rule affects executive salaries, most bonuses qualify as
performance-based, and standard stock options automatically qualify.
Therefore, this provision gives companies with highly paid executives an
incentive to give more pay in the form of bonuses and stock options, a
subject we return to in section 7. A summary description of the tax (and
accounting) treatment of cash and option compensation is in Table 1.
A far less common type of option, which is estimated to account for
about 5 percent of option grants, is the incentive stock option (ISO). While
ISOs are similar to NQSOs in their design, they are crucially different in
two respects. First, they have an annual cap of $100,000 per executive.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second, the tax treatment of ISOs is different. ISOs are completely un-
taxed at grant or exercise. It is only at sale that the executive is taxed, and
even then the executive is taxed at the lower capital gains tax rate. The
disadvantage is that the corporation never gets to take a parallel tax
deduction against corporate profits. Thus, ISOs become more attractive
as the personal tax rate increases and as the corporate tax rate and the
capital gains tax rates fall.
Two other related types of compensation, restricted stock and stock
appreciation rights, are worth brief discussion. Both, however, are far
less common than standard stock options. Restricted stock is payment in
the form of restricted shares, the restriction being that the shares vest
over time, as with options. Unlike options, the shares typically have
voting and dividend rights. With regard to taxation, the executive is
taxed at the personal rate on the value of the restricted stock as the
vesting restrictions lapse. However, the executive may choose to be
taxed at the grant date, in which case all subsequent appreciation is
taxed at the capital gains rate. The dividends paid to the executive are
taxed at the ordinary rate in the usual way. The company generally
receives a parallel deduction equal to the amount of the executive's
income when the executive is taxed. Unlike stock options, restricted
stock is not generally considered to be performance-based and is there-
fore subject to the million-dollar rule (unless the vesting of the restricted
stock is performance-based, which is sometimes the case).
Stock appreciation rights (SARs) are rights that replicate the payoffs of
stock options with a cash transfer. Thus SARs are simpler than options, in
that there is no requirement to buy and resell the stock in order to "cash
out." SARs generally have the same tax treatment as NQSOs, both to the
individual and to the corporation. SARs are relatively rare, however, be-
cause they have disadvantageous accounting treatment (described in the
next section) relative to stock options, and their main relative advantage
vis-à-vis options has been essentially replicated through broker-assisted
cashless option exerciseswhereby a broker makes a "nanosecond" loan
to the executive (to purchase and resell the stock) when the executive
wants to "cash in" on option profits. The tax and accounting treatment of
ISOs, restricted stock, and SARs is summarized in Table 2.
3.2 The Accounting Treatment of Options
Unlike cash compensation, which is expensed against earnings, there is
generally no expense recognition (at grant, exercise, or sale) for options,
whether they be NQSOs or ISOs. As a result, compensation consultants
often point out that stock options are the only form of compensation that
are free in an accounting sense, but stifi deductible for tax purposes.Taxation of Executive Compensation11
Stock options do, however, lead to expense recognition if they are dis-
counted (in the money at grant date) or if the exercise price and number
of options are not known at grant date. For discount options, the differ-
ence between the stock price and the market price is expensed over the
vesting period. For options with variable terms (e.g., a variable exercise
price, vesting that is tied to performance), the options are marked to
market and expensed during the time between grant and exercise. Practi-
tioners claim that the accounting treatment of options plays an impor-
tant role in the design of option programs. Thus, plans that have "bad
accounting" but are thought by many to have attractive incentive fea-
tures are often not even seriously considered by companies. Examples of
such potentially attractive plans include indexed options (where a CEO
profits only if his firm's share price grows relative to some market or
industry benchmark) and option grants that are explicitly performance-
related, both of which would lead to expenses against earnings.
Unlike options, restricted stock and SARs do not generally receive
favorable accounting treatment. Restricted stock is generally expensed
over the period in which the restrictions lapse (usually the vesting pe-
riod). The magnitude of the expense is the difference between the cur-
rent stock price and the executive's cost (if any). SARs are marked to
market each period, and the difference between the stock price and the
exercise price is expensed over the outstanding period of SARs.
4. THE TAXATION OF EXECUTIVE PAY: CASH
VERSUS OPTIONS
Stock-based compensation performs two roles in executive compensa-
tion arrangements. First, it helps align the incentives of the executive
with the interests of the firm's shareholders. Second, it often enables the
firm to compensate the CEO in a way that is more advantageous from a
tax standpoint than paying the executive in salary and bonus.
4.1 Agency Theory and Executive Compensation in the Presence
of Taxation
In standard agency-theory models (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency
costs are the result of the separation of ownership and control. Managers
do not have the same incentives as the owners. The optimal incentive
contract for managers balances the benefits of high-powered incentives
(linking the fortunes of owners and managers through stock and stock



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The effect of taxation on the optimal contract (more precisely, the
share of compensation that is performance-related) is ambiguous (even
in the absence of deductibility and deferral) because there are offsetting
effects. First, by reducing the share of corporate profits received by
shareholders, taxes diminish the importance to the shareholders of moti-
vating the CEO. Taken alone, this effect would imply that taxes would
be expected to reduce the use of performance-based compensation. Sec-
ond, because the government shares in the income received by the CEO,
the variance of the CEO's income is reduced, raising his utility, and
lowering the cost to the firm of providing any given set of incentives.
Third, because taxes wifi lead executives to provide less effort for any
given level of incentive-based pay, the level of compensation that must
be provided to compensate the CEO for effort is reduced, for a given
amount of incentive. These last two factors make it cheaper for the firm
to offer contracts to the CEO with large incentive components when tax
rates are higher, and should therefore increase the use of incentive-
based pay. Since the net effect of taxation on the level of incentive-based
pay is ambiguous, agency theory provides no strongpredictions about
how taxation should affect the optimal composition of option versus
cash compensation.
/
4.2 The Tax Advantages of Deferral
While agency theory yields ambiguous predictions about the effect of
taxes on the use of options, there are direct tax advantages of options in
that options provide executives with a way to defer compensation and
thereby lower their taxes. However, because options also lead to a defer-
ral of corporate tax deductibility, the tax advantages from a combined
(executive and corporate) perspective are not so straightforward. In this
section, we analyze and measure the tax advantages of stock options
relative to salary and bonus compensation. We also analyze the tax
advantages of NQSOs relative to ISOs. In particular, we show how the
tax advantages of options change as personal, corporate, andcapital
gains taxes change. We then show how the tax advantages of options
have changed over time in response to changing tax rates.
The crucial tax difference between standard options (NQSO5) and
cash payment is that option payouts are deferred, and the two forms of
compensation earn different rates of return over the deferral period. Any
analysis of the relative tax advantages of two compensation instruments
must consider the tax consequences both to the employer and to the
employeewhat Scholes and Wolfson (1992) call the global contracting
perspective. Thus, in order to make valid comparisons between the two,
we compare the tax burden to the executive, while holding constanttheTaxation of Executive Compensation15
posttax cost to the company. By keeping posttax employer costs (in NPV
terms) constant, any package that is preferred by the employee is tax-
advantaged in the global-contracting sense.
Under this methodology, a comparison of the tax advantages of op-
tions and cash involves comparing a pretax cash payment of P with an
option payment that has the equivalent posttax NPV to the company.
For NQSOs, it is straightforward to show that a pretax payment of P to
an executive has exactly the same cost to the company as putting aside P
for the purposes of paying stock-option payouts later. That is, if a com-
pany pays an executive P today, it wifi have the same amount of money
in N years as if it had put aside P today, let it accumulate at the rate of
return earned by the firm, and then paid it out (as compensation in the
form of option gains4) with any appreciation in year N.
Assume that the pretax profit rate is r, and the corporate tax rate is T.
Then, if the company pays P today, it receives a deduction today of PT,
which yields
[1 + r(1 - T)]' (1)
in N years, since the benefits of the tax deduction are invested in the
company and receive the after-tax corporate rate of return. Conversely,
if the company puts P aside today, then it grows at the after-tax corpo-
rate rate of return in N years to give a tax deduction of
P [1 + r (1 - T,)]N T (2) C,
which is the exact same value. Note that the equivalence of these two tax
deductions is analogous to the tax-benefit equivalence of front-loaded
and back-loaded IRAs.
An executive's payoff in N years from option profits is equal to P
compounded at the after-tax corporate rate times 1 - T, where T is the
personal tax rate. Thus, the combined payoffs in N years of the corporate
deduction and the executive's posttax payoff is
P [1 + r (1 - Ta)]" T + P [1 + r (1 - T)]" (1 - Tn), (3)
where the first term is the payoff from the corporate deduction and the
second term is the executive's payoff.
This analysis is not unique to options. Any form of deferred compensation that enables
executives to invest inside the firm at a higher posttax return or without paying capital
gains taxes would have similar effects.16Hall & Liebman
The payoff to salary and bonus in N years is more complicated, since
an assumption must be made about how the executive invests the origi-
nal cash compensation. For example, if the executive invests in an instru-
ment with taxable interest (e.g., bonds), then the N-year payoff from an
investment of P accumulates at the post-corporate-tax, post-personal-tax
rate of return and is
P (1 - T) [1 + r (1 - T)(1 - T)f'. (4)
However, if an executive invests in (non-dividend-paying) equities, the
investment accumulates at the higher post-corporate-tax rate of return,
with the offsetting disadvantage that the capital gains are taxed at the
capital gains rate in year N. So the executive receives
P [1 + r (1 - T)1N (1 - T) - Tcg{P (1 - T) [1 + r (1 - T)V" -
P (1 - T)}, (5)
where Tcg is the capital gains tax rate.5
Thus, putting the equations together, if an executive is paid cash P.
and invests y in bonds and 1 - y in equities, the N-year payoff (includ-
ing the payoff to the corporation from the tax deduction) is
P [1 + r (1 - T)]N y + y{(P [1 +(1 - T)(1 - T)]N (1 - T)}
+(1 - y) (P [1 + r (1 - T)V" (1 - T) - Tcg {P (1 - T)
[1 +r(1 - T)]N_p(1 - T)}). (6)
The tax advantage of options versus salary and bonus, therefore, is the
difference between the combined (corporate and executive) payoffs in
equation (3) and the combined payoffs in equation (6).
4.3 The Tax Advantage of Options
We now turn to analysis of how changes in various tax rates affect
the tax advantages of options relative to cash compensation. We focus
on the case in which the cash earned by executives is invested entirely
in equities, since equities are tax-favored relative to bonds. The impor-
tant conclusions of this analysis are not substantively different if we
In practice, executives hold a combination of equities and bondlike instruments with
taxable interest. Because equities are tax-favored, in the next section we simplify the analy-
sis by assuming that executives hold only equities. Alternatively, we could have assumed
that executives hold only less risky bonds, since bonds more closely match the risk proffle
of a stream of tax savings. None of our empirical results are substantively affected by this
simplification.Taxation of Executive Compensation17
instead assume that a portion of an executive's holdings are invested in
bonds.
4.3.1 The Tax Advantage of Options: Changing the Corporate Tax
RateStock options are tax-advantaged relative to cash simply because
option payouts are deferred, allowing the executive to invest at the pre-
personal-tax rate of return (with no capital gains tax at the end) rather
than investing at the after-tax rate of return or paying the capital gains
tax. Since the advantage of being able to defer taxes is large when the
corporate tax rate is low, the tax advantage of options is larger when the
corporate rate is low.
To illustrate this point, we define the tax advantage of options to be
the dollar amount by which total after-tax option payoffs (to the corpora-
tion and the executive) exceed the total payoffs from salary, as defined
by the difference of equation (3) and (6), assuming that P (the payment
to the executive) is equal to $100 and y = 0 (cash compensation is in-
vested in equities). We use a ten-year horizon, since most options have a
ten-year term. We then calculate how the tax advantage of options
changes as the corporate tax rate varies from zero to 100 percent, holding
the personal tax rate and the capital gains rate fixed at 40 percent and 20
percent respectively (which approximates current rates).
The top panel of Figure 2 shows the tax advantage of options relative
to cashprecisely, the NPV of the total tax advantage of options for a
$100 payment to the CEOas the corporate tax rate changes. As ex-
pected, the tax advantage of options declines as corporate tax rates in-
crease. At a zero corporate tax rate, the tax advantage of options has an
NPV of $7. This value is about $3.50 at a corporate rate of 40 percent.
When the corporate tax rate is 100 percent, the tax advantage of options
completely disappears, since the benefits of deferred compensation fall
to zero because the after-tax return on equities (and therefore the dis-
count rate) falls to zero. The tax advantage of options is the NPV of the
tax savings from avoiding the capital gains tax on ten years of apprecia-
tion, which is why it is relatively modest even at the 40-percent corpo-
rate rate.
4.3.2 The Tax Advantage of Options: Changing the Personal Tax
Rate Using the same assumptions as above (but this time holding the
corporate rate at 40 percent and the capital gains rate at 20 percent, and
varying the personal rate), the tax advantage of options declines as the
personal tax rate rises, as shown in the middle panel of Figure 2. The tax
advantage of options is higher at low personal tax rates because the
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avoiding the capital gains taxes is greater. The tax advantage of options
therefore declines linearly as the personal tax rate rises. At a 100-percent
personal tax rate, the executive receives nothing in either case, and by
construction, the company's tax deduction benefit is the same in NPV
terms, so the tax advantage of options falls to zero also.6
4.3.3 The Tax Advantage of Options: Changing the Capital Gains Tax
Rate The tax advantage of options for various capital gains rates is
depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2 under the same assumptions
(this time holding both the personal rate and the corporate rate at 40
percent, while varying the capital gains rate). The tax advantage of avoid-
ing the capital gains tax increases as the capital gains tax rate rises.
5. HOW HAS THE TAX ADVANTAGE OF OPTIONS
CHANGED OVER TIME?
The analysis so far has illustrated how the tax advantage of options
varies with the changes in tax rates. In this section, we show how the tax
advantage of options has changed over time as tax rates have changed.
5.1 Top Marginal Tax Rates over Time
The evolution on the top marginal tax ratespersonal, corporate, and
capital gainsfrom 1980 to 1998 is shown in Figure 3. In all cases, the
top rate (the rate for taxpayers with the highest incomes) is shown,
which is not always the highest rate, since various anomalies (such as
clawbacks of exemptions) sometimes lead to marginal tax rates that are
higher than those for the highest income tax payers.
The top personal tax rate was 70 percent in 1980, falling to 50 percent
in 1982 and 28 percent in 1988 following the 1986 tax act.7 The top
marginal tax rate has since risen to 39.6 percent, but is effectively 42.5
percent, since there is a 2.9-percent Medicare surcharge (paid half by the
employer and half by the employee) that has no upper limit. The top
corporate tax rate has had only one significant change since 1980, falling
from 46 percent before the 1986 tax act to 34 percent following the act in
1988. The top corporate tax rate was increased to 35 percent in 1993. The
6 This is one place where ignoring bond investments has substantive implications. In
particular, in the all-bond case the tax advantage of options is nonmonotonicit rises and
then fallsas personal tax rates rise.
Daring the early 1980s, the maximum tax on earned income limited the marginal tax rate
on the earnings of high earners, so many executives did not face a decline in personal tax
rates between 1981 and 1982. The empirical results in this paper are robust to assuming
that executives faced a marginal tax rate of 50 percent in 1980 and 1981.20Hall & Liebman
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FIGURE 3 Top Marginal Tax Rates since 1980
top capital gains rate has fluctuated between 28 percent (approximately)
and 20 percent since 1980, and is currently at 20 percent.
5.2 The Evolution of the Tax Advantage of NQSOs
The tax advantage of options relative to cash, defined in the same way as
in section 4, from 1980 to 1998 is shown in Figure 4. The calculations are
done using the same assumptions as before (i.e., N = 10 years and cash
is invested in equities), and the statutory top marginal tax rates shown in
Figure 3 are used. Due to the fall in corporate and personal tax rates, the
tax advantage of options increased sharply after the Tax Reform Act of
1986. This increase in tax advantage has largely been reversed in the
1990s as top personal tax rates have crept back up and the capital gains
rate has been reduced.
Two key facts emerge from this analysis. First, there is currently only a
moderate tax advantage to standard nonqualified stock optionson the
order of $4 per $100 of compensation. This is because the tax advantages
to the executive of deferring taxes are largely offset by the tax disad-
vantages to the company of not being able to deduct option expenses
from taxable profits until the executive exercises the options. Second,
although the 1986 tax act substantially increased the tax advantage of
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FIGURE 4 Tax Advantage of Options: 1980 to 1998
NPV of tax advantage of $100 in options (NQSOs) rather than cash.
5.3 The Tax (Dis)advantage of ISOs
So far the analysis has focused on the tax advantages ofNQSO5,since
they are so much more prevalent than ISOs, which account for only
about 5 percent of option grants. The relative scarcity of ISOs can be
explained both by their tax status and by their per-executive cap of
$100,000 per year.
Under what conditions are ISOs tax-preferred toNQSOs?For a trans-
fer P to an executive, the ISO is always tax-preferred by the executive
(since the capital gains rate is lower than the personal rate), while the
NQSOis always tax-preferred from the company's perspective (since an
ISO is not deductible). The key issue, however, is the relative advan-
tages of the two types of options from a global-contracting perspective.
Because ISOs are not deductible, the company is indifferent between
setting aside P in the form ofNQSOstoday and setting aside P(1 - T) in
the form of ISOs. (Since theNPVof the tax deduction forNQSO5 is PT,
theNPVof the payment P is P - PT, or P (1 -
Equalizing the posttax cost ofNQSOsand ISOs, we need only look at
the payoff of the executive to determine the condition under which each
is preferred. The payoff ofNQSOsinNyears is
Taxation of Executive Compensation21










The same payoff for ISOs is
P (1 - T,) [1 + r (1 - TC)IN (1 - Tcg). (8)
ISOs, therefore, are tax-advantaged if
T - Tcg> T - T Tcg (9)
Intuitively, ISOs are tax-advantaged only if their advantage (the differ-
ence between the personal rate and the capital gains rate) is large
enough to offset their cost (the disadvantage of not deducting at the
corporate rate). Note, however, that the condition is not a simple com-
parison between the corporate rate and the personal rate minus the
capital gains rate (T - Tcg> T).
Figure 5 shows how the tax advantage of NQSOs relative to ISOs has
changed since 1980 as tax rates have changed. Unlike the very modest
changes (around 3 to 4 percent) in the relative tax advantages between
options and cash shown in Figure 4, the relative tax advantage between
NQSOs and ISOs has seen enormous swings. When the top personal
rate was 70 percent in 1980, ISOs were tax-favored by a margin greater
than 6 percent. However, by 1982 (following the 1981 tax acts that dra-




















FIGURE 5 Tax Advantage of NQSOs Relative to ISOs over Time
NPV of tax advantage of $100 payment to executive: NQSOs minus ISOs.
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by about 5 percent. By 1988 (following the 1986 tax act), ISOs became tax-
disadvantaged by about 18 percent, a dramatic swing. The raising of
personal rates coupled with a decrease in the capital gains rate has since
reduced the tax disadvantage of ISOs to about $4 per $100 of pretax
compensation. Although hard data on ISOs are hard to come by, practi-
tioners (mostly compensation consultants) claim that ISOs were more
popular prior to 1982 when they were tax-advantaged. Although ISOs
are less disadvantageous from a tax standpoint relative to NQSOs than
they were in the late 1980s, they are stifi disadvantageous, so it is not
surprising that they have not made a significant resurgence in recent
years.
6. EXPLAINING THE INCREASE IN OPTION-BASED
COMPENSATION
In this section, we analyze whether changes in tax rates affect the compo-
sition of executive compensation, and consider the relative importance
of tax factors and corporate governance factors in explaining the in-
creasing share of compensation paid in the form of stock options. The
numerous changes in tax rates that have occurred since 1980 provide an
opportunity to assess whether executive compensation arrangements
respond to tax incentives in the way that the tax-avoidance model sug-
gests. We test this model using a panel data set of CEOs in large
publicly-traded U.S. corporations. Our identification of the tax effects
relies on time-series variation in personal, corporate, and capital gains
tax rates along with cross-sectional variation in corporate tax rates.
6.1 Data
We use a 15-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest publicly-traded
U.S. corporations, which is described in Hall and Liebman (1998). The
data set covers the years from 1980 through 1994, and combines CEO
compensation information from corporate proxies and 10-K fflings with
stock price and stock return information from CRSP and accounting data
from Compustat. In addition, some compensation data from the 1970s
were collected in order to construct measures of the value of stock op-
tions held by the CEOs in the first period of the sample.8
The feature that distinguishes our data from most other CEO data
sets is that with our panel of yearly proxy data on option grants, option
gains, and total options held, we are able to calculate the total value of
8We are grateful to David Yermack for providing us with some of the data for 1984 to 1991.
See Yermack (1995) for a discussion of these data.24Hall & Liebman
all stock options held by the CEO at a point of time. More importantly,
since we have the details about the stock options held (number, exer-
cise price, time to maturity, etc.), we can precisely calculate the change
in the value of a CEO's stock option holdings for a given change in firm
value.
6.2 Identification Issues
The numerous tax changes over our sample period and the specific ways
in which changes in personal, corporate, and capital gains rates are
predicted to affect the composition of CEO compensation give us un-
usually rich sources of identification. However, because many of the
changes in tax rates would be expected to affect all of the CEOs in our
sample in a similar way, we wifi need to pay particular attention to
separating out the tax effects from underlying time trends and other
factors that changed over time. Controlling for underlying trends is par-
ticularly important in this study because we are focusing on an out-
comethe use of stock optionsthat has increased rapidly over the
past two decades, and that many practitioners believe was importantly
affected by nontax considerations. Thus the tax effects we are trying to
explain are deviations from a rising trend.
We take two steps to try to separate out the tax effects from the
underlying trend. First, we include key nontax factors that could poten-
tially explain the increasing reliance on performance-based compensa-
tion. It has been suggested that the dramatic increase in incentive-based
pay is the result of the remarkably poor shareholder returnsduring the
1970s, which spurred the LBO and takeover movements of the 1980s.
According to this story (Kaplan, 1997), shareholders became much more
powerful via the rise of institutional investors, even as the LBO and
takeover movements waned. Because the influence of institutional inves-
tors is thought to be one of the most important mechanisms of strong
corporate governance, we use the share of each company's stock owned
by institutional investors (defined as institutions with more than $100
million under management) as an explanatory variable.9 The percentage
of shares owned by large institutional investors increased from about 20
percent to almost 50 percent in 1994, an upward trend that closely
matches the sharp rise in the share of compensation in the form of
options. Indeed, in our sample, the annual average (over all of the firms
in our sample) share of stock owned by institutional investors has a
correlation of 0.9 with the annual average share of compensation paid in
options.
This variable is described in Gompers and Metrick (1998).Taxation of Executive Compensation25
In addition, we include two other variables that proxy for stronger
corporate governance. The first is the size of the board. Evidence suggests
that boards with smaller numbers of directors reduce the influence of the
CEO and better represent shareholder interests (Yermack, 1995). Board
size fell by approximately 15 percent between 1980 and 1994. The second
variable is the fraction of the firm's board members who are inside direc-
tors or gray directors (noninsiders who have business dealings with the
company). Firms with fewer outsiders are less likely to act in the share-
holders' interests, and we would predict that they would be less likely to
have performance-based compensation for their CEOs. Theaverage per-
centage of inside and gray directors has decreased from about 45 percent
in 1980 to about 35 percent in 1994.
Second, we allow for cross-sectional variation in corporate tax rates.
Corporate marginal tax rates vary because firms may be eligible for tax-
loss carrybacks and carryforwards, investment tax credits, and the alter-
native minimum tax (see Auerbach, 1986; Auerbach and Altshuler,
1990; Auerbach and Poterba, 1987). Because these cross-sectional differ-
ences imply that different firms should respond differently to a given
change in tax rates, they potentially provide us with away to isolate
the tax effects. Firm-specific corporate marginal tax ratesare notori-
ously difficult to calculate from publicly-available data. Weuse a tricho-
tomous variable that equals zero if the firm has tax-loss carryforwards
and negative earnings in a given year, equals 0.5 times the statutory
corporate rate if the firm has only one of those conditions, and equals
the statutory rate if the firm has neither loss carryforwardsnor negative
earnings.10
The cross-sectional variation in the corporate tax rate may not beex-
ogenous. Firms that perform poorly could face low marginal tax rates
and also be particularly likely or unlikely to provide performance-based
pay. Because most of our specifications use fixed effects, the correlation
we must be concerned about is between changes in firm performance
and changes in compensation. We deal with this by controlling for
lagged firm stock market performance in our regressions. This should
eliminate spurious correlation between tax rates and compensation that
is jointly caused by firm performance.
Graham (1996) presents evidence that the trichotomous variable performs nearly as well
as his recommended simulated marginal tax rate. Plesko (1999) compares marginal tax
rates calculated from Compustat data with actual marginal tax rates from firm tax returns.
He finds that simple binary variables are more reliable measures of the marginal tax rate
than is either the Graham or the trichotomous variable. We obtain substantively similar
results when we switch from the trichotomous variable to the binary variables recommend
by Plesko.26Hall & Liebman
6.3 Results
The dependent variable in our regressions is the fraction of a CEO's total
annual compensation (measured as the BlackScholes value of stock-
option grants plus salary and bonus) that comes from stock-option
grants. We choose this reduced-form specification because our interest is
in the composition of CEO compensation. However, the factorsthat
affect the composition of compensation might also affect the levels, and
it wifi be important to keep this in mind in interpreting our results.
Optimal-contracting theory generally makes predictions about the in-
centives provided by the total amount of firm stock and stock options
owned by the CEO. We choose to model the flow of option grants rather
than the ultimate performance sensitivity of the CEO's compensation
and stock and stock-option holdings because we have in mind an
adjustment-cost model in which it takes time for a CEO's holdings of
stock and stock options to reach the optimal level.11 In our regressions,
we include two measures of the currentperformance sensitivity of the
CEO's wealth to firm performance as explanatory variables to reflect the
distance of the CEO's contract from the optimal contract.
Table 3 presents results in which the tax effects are identified solely by
variation in tax rates over time. The fraction of annual compensation paid
in stock options is regressed on tax variables, corporate governance vari-
ables, contract-theory variables, and variables reflecting stock market re-
turns. Both of the regressions in this table include firm fixed effects. In
colunm (1), the fraction in annual compensation paid in stock options is
regressed on the log difference in payoff (the combined payoff to both the
firm and the CEO) from receiving compensation in stock options rather
than salary and bonus, where the payoff calculations are based on statu-
tory marginal tax rates. This variable is defined as the logdifference be-
tween equation (3) and equation (6) in section 4. The coefficient on the tax
variable is large and statistically significant at the 95-percent level. The
point estimate implies that a one-percent increase in the payoff difference
between stock options and salary and bonus results in a 2.4-percentage-
point increase in the share of compensation paid in stock options.
The corporate governance variables all have the predicted sign. Firms
with a higher fraction of their shares owned by institutional investors,
use more performance-based pay (stock options).Firms with large corpo-
rate boards, or a large share of inside directors, are less likely to usestock
options.
The two contract-theory variables are the dollar change in CEO wealth
' See Core and Guay (1999) for evidence that firms adjust in this way.TABLE 3
Compensation Regressions that Rely on Variation in
Tax Rates over Time
Dependent variable: share of compensation paid in options. Standard errors in parentheses. Both
regressions in this table include firm fixed effects.
Log difference in payoff is the log difference in combined firm and CEO after-tax share between
paying compensation in options and paying salary.
This variable is the dollar change in CEO wealth per $1,000 change in firm market value (see
Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
This variable in the dollar charge in CEO wealth per 10-percent change in firm value (See Hall and
Liebman, 1998).
Standard deviation of firm market value in trillions.
(1) (2)
Tax variables:




In (1statutory cap. gains
rate)





Fraction of firm's shares
owned by institutional
investors
0.043 (.029) 0.052 (0.028)
Size of the firm's board of
directors
0.002 (.001) 0.003 (0.001)
Fraction of directors who
are inside or gray
0.082 (.033) 0.092 (0.030)
Contract-theory variables:
zl (CEO wealth) per $1,000
in FV)
0.261 (0.095) 0.247 (0.087)
(CEO wealth) per 10% iii
(c)
5.83 (1.89) 5.54 (2.01)
Volatility(d) 5.21 (4.24) 2.61 (3.69)
In (firm market value) 0.019 (0.006) 0.019 (0.006)
Stock market return variables:
Lagged annual firm stock
market return
0.006 (0.009) 0.003 (0.008)
Lagged annual S&P 500 re-
turn
0.035 (0.023) 0.029 (0.023)
Regression diagnostics:
Total sample size 5179 5179
Firms 427 427
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.31128Hall & Liebman
per $1,000 change in firm value (Jensen andMurphy, 1990) and the
dollar change in CEO wealth per 10-percent change in firm value (Hall
and Liebman, 1998). As discussed in Baker and Hall (1998), these two
wealth sensitivity measures reflect two different concepts of how closely
aligned the managers' incentives are with the interests of the sharehold-
ers. In the regression they are meant to measure howfar the CEO's
existing contract and ownership of stock and stock options is from the
optimal level. The negative coefficients on the two variables suggests
that firms that are below their optimal pay-to-performance sensitivity
are more likely to give more stock options in the currentperiod.
The second colunm replaces the tax variable motivated by deferral
advantages with the three statutory rates. The corporate after-tax share
has a positive coefficient, as we would expect, because the tax advantage
of stock options increases as the corporate rate falls. The coefficient on
the personal tax rate is small and statistically insignificant. The sign of
the coefficient on the capital gains rate is the opposite of that predicted
by tax-avoidance theory.
Note that these results rely on time-series variation alone. This is not a
very convincing test. Since the log difference inpayoffs mostly rises over
the time period covered in our sample, as does the share of compensa-
tion paid in options, it is possible that the tax variable is simply reflecting
other factors that were changing over this time period that we have not
included in our regression. Therefore, it is important to look at specifica-
tions that rely on cross-sectional variation in the tax variables.
Table 4 contains specifications that rely on cross-sectional variation in
corporate tax rates. The first column repeats the specification from col-
umn (1) of Table 3, but uses the trichotomous measuresof firm corporate
tax rates in place of the statutory rate in calculating each firm's log
difference in payoff from paying compensation in options rather than in
salary and bonus. As in the previous table, we find the positive coeffi-
cient on the log difference in payoff, just as the theory suggest. How-
ever, the coefficient estimate is now muchsmaller, suggesting that a
one-percent increase in the log difference in payoff produces a 0.1-
percentage-point increase in the share of compensation paid in options.
Introducing cross-sectional variation in the dependent variable does
not eliminate the potentially spurious correlation over time between the
tax variable and the share of compensation paid in options. The second
column of Table 4 isolates the pooled cross-sectional variation in corpo-
rate tax rates by adding time dummies and dropping the firm fixed
effects. In this specification, the coefficient on the tax variable is indistin-
guishable from zero. The coefficient on the institutional variable contin-
ues to be large and statistically significant. The thirdcolumn includesTaxation of Executive Compensation29
both firm fixed effects and time dummies, which tests for a relationship
between within-firm changes in the dependent variable and within-firm
changes in each explanatory variable. In this specification, the coefficient
on the tax variable is again indistinguishable from zero. The coefficients
on the corporate governance variables are also statistically insignificant.
The third column contains a specification that treats the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA 86) as a natural experiment. For firms and CEOs facing
the statutory corporate tax rate, TRA 86 increased the relative payoff to
paying compensation in options by 1.7 percent. For a firm facing a zero
marginal tax rate, it reduced the relative payoff by 4.5 percent. The reduc-
tion occurred because TRA 86 reduced the personal tax rate, making
salary and bonus more attractive, while the decreased corporate rate had
no effect on zero-tax-rate firms. Thus, we would expect firms facing zero
or low marginal tax rates to reduce their use of options after TRA 86,
while firms facing the statutory rate would be expected to increase them.
Few firms face zero marginal tax rates year after year. Therefore, we try
to distinguish between firms that often face low tax rates and firms that
nearly always face the statutory rate. We define low-tax firms as ones
whose average marginal tax rate over 1984 to 1986 was below 0.24.12
Then we ran a difference-in-differences regression to see if high-tax
firms increased their use of options more than low-tax firms. The interac-
tion between post-TRA 86 and high corporate tax rates is the key vari-
able. The estimated coefficient on this variable is positive, but small and
not statistically different from zero at the 95-percent level.
It is important to note that in this specification as well, the main corpo-
rate governance variable, the share of the firm's shares owned by institu-
tional investors, performs as theory would predict. The variable appears
to be quite robust. Table 5 presents regressions of the share of compensa-
tion paid in stock options on the fraction of the firm's shares owned by
institutional investors. Since we have already established that these vari-
ables have a strong longitudinal relationship, the regressions here are
designed to focus on the cross-sectional relationship between these two
variables. The first and third columns present regressions using data only
from 1994, and find a coefficient of roughly 0.2 (column 1 contains no
other covariates, while column 3 includes all of the other nontax covari-
ates from the regressions in Tables 3 and 4). Since the median share of a
firm's stock owned by institutional investors in our sample rises from 19
percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 1994, this coefficient would imply that this
12This cutoff was chosen after inspecting the distribution of tax rates, and essentially






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Large Institutional Investors and Stock-Option Compensation:
The Cross-sectional Relationship between Institutional Investors and
Option Grants
The dependent variable is the share of compensation paid in options.
factor alone can explain 6 percentage points of the 23-percentage-point
increase in the median share of compensation paid in options that oc-
curred over this time period. Of course, this variable is only one measure
of the strengthening of corporate governance, so the total impact of im-
proved corporate governance could be greater. The second and fourth
columns of the table use the entire 1980-1994 sample, and include time
dummies to isolate the cross-sectional correlations. Again, there is evi-
dence of a strong cross-sectional relationship between the two variables,
although the coefficients are slightly smaller, perhaps reflecting a weaker
corporate-governance role in the earlier period. In sum, there is a strong
relationship, in both longitudinal and cross-sectional data, between the
institutional-investor variable and the options-percentage variable.'3
7. THE MILLION-DOLLAR RULE
In 1993, section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted,
limiting the deductibility of executive compensation in excess of one
million dollars, unless the compensation was performance-related. Pro-
ponents of this legislation argued that it would slow the growth of
executive pay and tighten the link between firm performance and execu-
tive compensation.
The new provision became effective for tax year 1994 and applies to
the CEO and the other four most highly compensated executives in each
company. Pay that is performance-related, such as stock-option grants
The one specification in which the fraction owned by institutional investors is not
significant is in column (2) of Table 4, a regression that includes both fixed effects and time
effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient on fraction of
firm's shares owned by
institutional investors
.217 (.067).145 (.014).177 (.069).120 (.015)
Sample period 1994 1980-1994 1994 1980-1994
Contract-theory and stock
market covariates
No No Yes Yes
Time dummies No Yes No YesTaxation of Executive Compensation33
and bonuses paid for meeting clear performance goals, is not affected by
this regulation, provided that it has been approved by shareholders.
Thus, the main impact of the provision is to limit the deductibility of
salary in excess of a million dollars. Woodlock and Antenucci (1997)
studied the proxy statements of 376 firms and documented that most
firms responded to the new law by qualifying top executivepay as
performance-related. Perry and Zenner (1999) identified 25 firms that
reduced salaries from above $1 million to below $1 million and found
that 23 of the firms cited section 162(m) as their reason for doingso.
In this section of the paper we investigate whether this provision has
affected the level or structure of executive pay, using the Execucomp
data base, which contains information on the highest-paid executives in
each of the firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap
600. Between 1993 and 1998 the median salary of the Execucomp execu-
tives rose from $230,000 to $306,000. The median value of total compen-
sation (salary, bonus, and option grants) rose from $470,000 to $882,000.
Limiting the sample of CEOs indicates that the total compensation of the
median CEO rose from $1.1 million to $1.8 million over the period, while
the median salary rose from $441,000 to $550,000. Thus executive com-
pensation clearly continued to rise at a rapid rate after the implementa-
tion of the million-dollar rule, though perhaps at a slower rate than it
otherwise would have.
If the regulation affects behavior, it should have the largest impact on
firms whose executives are receiving salaries that are above the limit or
just below it. Thus, we might expect to see firms whose executives are
receiving relatively high salaries to rely more heavily on performance-
based pay and less heavily on salary in the years following the regulation.
Perry and Zenner (1999) and Livingston (1999) both find that this is the
case. This trend can be clearly identified in the Execucomp data set. For
example, over 1993 to 1998 the median annualized growth rate of salary
for executives whose 1993 salary was below $500,000 in the previous year
was 8.5 percent. For executives with salary between $500,000 and
$700,000 it was 6.4 percent, for executives between $700,000 and $850,000
it was 5.0 percent, for executives between $750,000 and $1 million it was
3.1 percent, and for executives above $1 million it was 0.0 percent.14
The observation that executives at lower levels of salary had higher
growth rates is not very strong evidence of an impact of section 162(m),
however, because it is possible that low-salary executives would have
had higher growth rates even in the absence of the provision. To explore
14Of the 3137 executives for whom we have complete data between 1993 and 1998, 2708
had 1993 salaries below $500,000, while only 35 had 1993 salaries above $1 million.34Hall & Liebman
whether this is the case, we use Execucomp data from both before and
after the law change. Ideally, we would want to have data from many
years before the change to examine whether there is anunderlying pat-
tern of faster salary growth for low-salary executives. Unfortunately,the
Execucomp data begin in 1992 and therefore provide us with only the
1992-1993 growth rate in compensation to use as a baseline.15
We run regressions pooling data from 1992-1993 through 1997-1998
of the annual percentage change in different forms of compensation on a
variable, MILLION, that is designed to measure the likelthood that an
executive's compensation wifi be affected by section 162(m). We define
MILLION as the minimum of 1 and the executive's salarydivided by $1
million in the previous year. Thus, any executive with salary at or above
$1 million would receive a value of 1, while an executive with a salary of
$500,000 would be coded as a 0.5.16 We include this variable by itself and
also interacted with a dummy variable (AFTER) that equals 1 for years
1994 and after. Thus the MILLION variable is designed to pick up any
underlying relationship between the level of salary and the growth rate
of salary, while the interacted one wifi identify any differential growth
rate of salary by income in the period after section 162(m) took effect. We
also include a full set of year dummies, the natural logarithm of the
firm's market value, and the firm's annual rate of return over the two
previous years as control variables. To reduce the sensitivity of our re-
sults to outliers, we run quantile regressions and robust regressions.
Table 6 contains our results. The first four columns are for all top
executives, while the last four columns focus on CEOs. Columns (1) and
(2) present estimates from robust regression for the percentage change in
salary and the percentage change in total compensation (salary, bonus,
stock grants, and stock-option grants). In the salary growth regressions
for all executives, the coefficient on MILLION is negative and significant,
indicating that there is an underlying relationship between the level of
executive compensation and its subsequent growth rate. The coefficient
on MILLION X AFTER 1S negative as well, suggestingthat the negative
relationship between the level of salary and its subsequent growth rate
intensified slightly after 1994. The relatively small magnitude suggests
that an executive with a $1 million dollar salary would see his salary
grow at an annual rate that would be about 0.6 percentslower than an
executive earning $500,000.
15 The Hall-Liebman data set contains only a combined salary and bonus variable, making
it impossible to use it to analyze this issue.
16 We also ran the regressions (not reported) allowing for a nonlinear relationship between





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the second column the coefficient on MILLION X AFTER is essentially
zero, suggesting that any decrease in salarybrought about by section
162(m) was offset by increases in bonus and stock-option grants. The
results are similar for the median regressions. There is some evidence of
a very small slowdown in growth of salaryfor executives likely to be
affected by section 162(m), but no sign of a change in total compensa-
tion. Taken together, this provides evidence of a very small substitution
of performance-related pay for salary.
The last four columns run identical tests but limit the sample to CEOs.
The interaction of MILLION X AFTER continues to be small and negative in
the salary regressions. In contrast, the impact of 162(m) on total compen-
sation appears to be positive and fairly substantial (about 15 percentage
points per year) in these regressions. That is, the increase in bonus and
stock options following the million-dollar rule more than offset the very
small decline in salary.
All of these conclusions should be interpreted somewhat cautiously,
because our data provide us with only one pre-1993 control year. Never-
theless, the data are consistent with section 162(m) having led to a very
minor slowdown in salary growth, and one that is dramatically smaller
than what one would conclude without controlling for underlyingdiffer-
ential salary growth rates at different levels of salary. Since total compen-
sation for CEOs did not decline, and perhaps increased, there is evidence
of a minor substitution of performance-related pay for salary in response
to the regulation.
8. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE
ELASTICITY OF TAXABLE INCOME
Even if taxes have only a minor effect on executive compensation,the
structure of executive compensation is important for tax policybe-
cause high-income taxpayers are sourcesof significant revenue and are
the focus of important debates about the efficiency cost of taxation.
Goolsbee (1999) has recently argued that executive decisions to exer-
cise options are highly responsive to intertemporal differences in tax
rates created by tax reforms. He claims that much of the apparentdecline
in taxable income for high-income taxpayers between 1992 and 1993
documented by Feldstein and Feenberg (1996) can be explained by execu-
tives shifting option gains into 1992 in order to avoid the higher marginal
tax rates that went into effect in 1993. By extension, he impliesthat the
high elasticities of taxable income with respect to personal tax rates
estimated by comparing the pre- and post-tax-reform taxable income ofTaxation of Executive Compensation37
high-income individuals reflect intertemporal shifting of income and not
permanent effects of taxation. If this is true, then the deadweight loss of
taxation is lower, as is the cost of progressivity.
While Goolsbee presents comprehensive evidence that option gains
were unusually high in 1992, his identification of the impact of tax rates on
the timing of option gains depends on correctly specifying a counter-
factual level of options that would have been exercised in the absence of
the tax change. He simply assumes a linear time trend. The purpose of
Goolsbee's time trend is presumably to account for the increasing use of
options over time. However, since options typically require a vesting
period of at least a couple of years, a much more direct measure of ex-
pected option gains can be constructed, based on the total value of vested
options held by the CEO. Since options typically have vesting periods that
exceed two years, this total can be treated as exogenous, since it wifi not be
affected by the tax changes.
More generally, the value of options held by the CEO is likely to have
a major effect on his exercise decisions. If his options are out of the
money, he wifi not have gains to realize. If there has been a recent run-
up in the market, an optimizing CEO may exercise an unusually large
amount of options in order to diversify his overall portfolio, and if in-
the-money options are about to expire, they wifi be exercised in the
current year.
Our evidence suggests that much of the apparent tax shifting can
instead be attributed to stock market performance and the timing of past
option grants. Using our 15-year panel, we replicate Goolsbee's (1999)
result for the 1993 period, but show that the impact of taxes is not
present in other time periods. Moreover, even the result for the 1993
period disappears when appropriate controls for past option grants and
stock price appreciation are included.
The top three rows of Table 7 present data on the taxable incomes of
CEOs in the HallLiebman sample. For these results our panel has been
narrowed to include only CEOs whose firm's fiscal years correspond
with tax years. In addition, we create a balanced panel for each of the
three tax-reform periods by excluding any firm for which there are not
complete data for the period surrounding the reform.
The fourth row of the table shows that the 1993 tax act raised the top
marginal personal income tax rate from 31.0 to 39.6 percent effective for
tax year 1993, with a further increase occurring in 1994 due to the uncap-
ping of the Medicare payroll tax. The top row of the table shows that
taxable income was higher in 1992 than for any other year in our sample
(all data are in 1994 dollars). Option gains were particularly high in




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Taxation of Executive Compensation39
1994 level. These patterns are consistent with Goolsbee's claim that tax-
payers responded to the anticipated increase in marginal tax rates by
shifting gains into 1992.
The evidence from the other two tax reforms is less clear, suggesting
that there might be factors other than tax rates determining the timing of
option gains. ERTA 1981 reduced the top marginal tax rate from 70
percent in 1980 to 50 percent in 1982. However, there is no sign that
option gains were reduced in 1980 and 1981 and then increased in 1982.17
There was a big increase in option gains in 1983, however. Similarly, the
highest year of stock-option gains in the period around 1986 was 1987, a
strange year to take gains, since taxpayers would have known that the
personal rate would be 10 percentage points lower if they waited until
the following year.18
What all the peak years of option gains have in common is that they
follow years of strong stock market performance. The fifth row of Table 7
shows the average stock market return during the previous year for the
firms in our sample. The large value of option gains in 1983 followed a
35.5-percent increase in the stock market. The 1992 boom in option gains
followed a 46.6-percent increase in the stock market; the more modest
1987 peak in option gains followed a 19-percent gain (and a 43-percent
gain two years before).
Strong stock market performance raises the value of options available
to exercise. The sixth row of the table shows the mean value of options
held by CEOs at the beginning of the year. AU three of the peak years of
option gains correspond with peak years in terms of the value of options
available for exercise. Since stock market appreciation during the year
also increases the value of options available to exercise later in that year,
we need to allow for current-year stock market appreciation as well.
Table 8 contains Goolsbee-style regressions for each of the tax re-
forms. The first two columns reprint the results from Goolsbee (1999).
The third and fourth columns replicate his results in our sample. In
particular, with a specification similar to his, we are able to replicate his
finding that the current after-tax share has a positive coefficient and the
following year's after-tax share has a coefficient of roughly negative one.
Columns (5) through (8) show that this pattern was unique to the 1993
tax reform. Indeed, in the TRA 86 regressions the coefficient on the
As we explained above, for executives covered by the maximum tax on earned income,
there was not a decline in tax rates between 1981 and 1982.
18It is possible that the large stock market decline in October 1997 may have prompted
some people to exercise options earlier than they otherwise would have. However, an































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Taxation of Executive Compensation41
TABLE 9
Alternative Explanations for the Timing of Option Exercises
The dependent variable is the log of taxable income. All regressions contain firm fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
following year's tax rate is positive and significant. Columns (9) and (10)
pooi all three reforms and fail to replicate the pattern that would reflect
intertemporal shifting.19
It is possible that the ease with which one can shift the timing of
option gains is asymmetric. It may be harder to shift option gains for-
ward in time, since some options expire and therefore must be exercised
now. In addition, options were a much smaller portion of compensation
in the early 1980s, so perhaps the ERTA 81 results are not surprising.
Nonetheless, these results cast doubt on the proposition that this is the
channel through which spurious estimates of the elasticity of taxable
income have occurred for previous tax reforms, and they suggest that
we should look harder for alternative explanations for the timing of
option gains.
Table 9 attempts to predict options gains using the lagged and current
increase in a firm's market value and the value of the options held by the
CEO at the start of the year. The two stock market variables strongly
predict option gains, while the value of options held has the correct sign












ln[1-tax(t)J 0.108 0.111 -0.051 0.201
(0.324) (0.136) (0.048) (0.057)
in[1-tax(t+1)] -0.134 0.573 0.125 0.150
(0.336) (0.156) (0.053) (0.066)
ln(market value) 0.418 0.177 0.338 0.418
(0.061) (0.039) (0.046) (0.163)
Firm's stock market return (t) 0.298 0.268 0.214 0.258
(0.044) (0.045) (0.031) (0.023)
Firm's stock market return 0.162 0.206 0.031 0.128
(t-1) (0.041) (0.008) (0.029) (0.021)
In(value of options held by 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.009
CEO at start of year) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Years 1990-19941985-19891980-19831980-1994
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.71 0.82 0.68
Observations 1349 1427 1036 381242Hall & Liebman
in all of the specifications and is significant in the pooled sample even
though it is highly correlated with the two stock market return variables.
In contrast, the tax-timing explanation fails, even in the 1993 period.
It is important to realize that our results do not invalidate Goolsbee's
critique of claims that aggregate revenue data from 1992 and 1993 prove
that elasticities of taxable income are large. We have simply given an
alternative explanation for why taxable incomes were unusually high in
1992. However, our results do cast doubt on the conclusion that large
timing shifts are ubiquitous and capable of explaining away the more
careful estimates of taxable income elasticities that have been performed
using micro data (e.g., Feldstein, 1995; Auten and Carroll, 1995).
One further point is in order. It is sometimes argued that the combina-
tion of increased use of options and the booming stock market explains
why federal tax revenues have been so much higher than expected dur-
ing the 1990s. However, while large option gains increase revenue from
the personal income tax, they produce offsetting deductions for cor-
porations. The net impact on revenue is only the difference in the two
marginal tax rates times the option gain. While the gap between the
personal rate and the effective corporate rate is nontrivial, the impact of
large option exercises on total revenue is substantially smaller than the
amount by which the exercises inflate personal tax revenue and reduce
corporate tax revenue.
9. CONCLUSION
We have described the tax rules for executive pay in detail and analyzed
how changes in various tax rates affect the tax advantages of stock options
relative to salary and bonus. We find that there is a moderate tax advan-
tage to optionscurrently about $4 per $100 in pretax executive pay
and that changes in the tax advantage of options over time have had at
most a modest impact on the composition of pay. Corporate governance
factors, particularly the role of large investors, appear to be more impor-
tant in explaining the dramatic increase in option pay.
In addition, our evidence suggests that more direct attempts to use tax
policy to influence executive compensation have had little effect. We
find that the million-dollar rule led companies to substitute perfor-
mance-based pay for salary But our evidence suggests that this substitu-
tion was quite modest, and there is no evidence that the, total level of pay
was reduced. Overall, although the stock-option explosion has dramati-
cally increased the link between pay and performance, this change is
due almost entirely to nontax factors.REFERENCES
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